The Lemon Test Rears Its Ugly Head Again: Lamb\u27s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District by Marks, Wirt P., IV
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 5 Article 7
1993
The Lemon Test Rears Its Ugly Head Again: Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District
Wirt P. Marks IV
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation




THE LEMON TEST REARS ITS UGLY HEAD AGAIN:
LAMB'S CHAPEL V. CENTER MORICHES UNION FREE
SCHOOL DISTRICT
Like some ghoul in a late night horror movie that repeatedly
sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeat-
edly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again -Justice Scalia'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1971, Establishment Clause cases have been analyzed
under the three-prong test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 However, this test has often been criti-
cized for producing inconsistent results.3 In addition, inconsis-
1. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. See generally Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion,
and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1993) (arguing the Court's inability to
address Establishment Clause issues concretely stems from the Court's disregard of
religion's sociological function); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Cross-
roads, 59 U. CM. L. REV. 115 (1992) (discussing the inconsistent history of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence since the Burger Court); Shanin Rezai, County of Alleghe-
ny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
503 (1990) (discussing problems with the Lemon test and proposing a reformulated
version of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment
1153
1154 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1153
tent application of the test by the Court, and conflicting phi-
losophies among judges and scholars regarding the separation
of church and state, have resulted in considerable objection to
the Lemon test. In fact, at least five of the current Supreme
Court Justices have expressed their dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test as a workable framework for Establishment Clause
analysis.4
In 1992 the Supreme Court by a narrow majority banned
ceremonial prayer at public school graduation exercises.5 The
Court did not apply the Lemon analysis, a move which signaled
that the Court reassessed the future applicability of the Lemon
test. However, one year later in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District6 the Court failed to reject
the Lemon test once again and applied Lemon's three-prong
analysis to conclude that a church group's use of public school
facilities did not violate the Establishment Clause.7
Consequently, the future of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
remains uncertain.
Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
905 (1987) (supporting a revised version of the Lemon test).
4. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., with whom Rehn-
quist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J., join, dissenting) ("Our religion-clause jurispru-
dence has become bedeviled (so to speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that
are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional
traditions."); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Scalia, J., join,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am content for present purposes to
remain within the Lemon framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let
alone adopting, that test as our primary guide in this difficult area."); Corporation of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 346 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I write separately to note that this action
once again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the test articu-
lated in Lemon v. Kurtzman."); Wallace v. Jafflee, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) ("The three-part Lemon test has simply not provided adequate
standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to
realize.").
5. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
6. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
7. Id. at 2148. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . ."); see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)
(extending the Establishment Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
LAMB'S CHAPEL
This Casenote discusses the Supreme Court's holding in
Lamb's Chapel and the impact of this decision on future Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence focusing on the application of the
Lemon test. Part II briefly describes the history and back-
ground of the Lemon test; part III contains an analysis of three
recent Supreme Court decisions preceding Lamb's Chapel; part
IV discusses and analyzes the background of and the Supreme
Court's holding in Lamb's Chapel.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE LEMON TEST
The United States Supreme Court has long struggled with
philosophical differences and concerns regarding the relation-
ship between church and state.8 In 1947 in Everson v. Board of
Education,9 Justice Black adopted a strict separationist stan-
dard: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can
pass laws which aid one religion, all religions, or prefer one
religion over another ... ."" However, one year later Justice
Reed argued for an accomodationist interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause." Noting that Congress aided religion
throughout history, 2 Justice Reed concluded that the purpose
of the Establishment Clause was not to impose "an absolute
prohibition against every conceivable situation where [church
and state] may work together." 3 These fundamental differenc-
es over the underlying purpose of the Establishment Clause
have long plagued the Court, leading to inconsistent results and
conflict among jurists over the proper analytical approach to
Establishment Clause issues. 4
8. See generally Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Re-
examination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1984) (tracing
the history of the Establishment Clause); Daniel A. Spiro, The Creation of a Free
Marketplace of Religious Ideas: Revisiting the Establishment Clause After the Alabama
Secular Humanism Decision, 39 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1987) (discussing Madison's and Jeff-
erson's views).
9. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10. Id. at 16.
11. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
12. Id. at 253-54 (Reed, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 256 (Reed, J., dissenting).
14. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (applying accommodation
principles); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying separationist
1993] 1155
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:1153
However, three principles emerged which became the basis
for future Establishment Clause analysis. In McGowen v. Mary-
land,5 the Court validated Maryland's Sunday closing laws,
concluding that a secular purpose for the laws exist-
ed-providing a uniform day of rest. 6 In Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp," the Court expanded its inquiry by analyz-
ing the primary effect of the state action. The Court held that
reading the Bible at the opening of each school day had the
effect of advancing religion and therefore violated the Establish-
ment Clause. 8 Finally, in Walz v. Tax Commission,9 the
Court upheld a New York state law granting tax exemptions to
religious properties, concluding that the law did not lead to
"excessive entanglement" with religion.2 ° The principles relied




In 1971 the Supreme Court recognized that a strict "wall of
separation" approach was not possible, as "[slome relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevit-
able."22 In Lemon, two state statutes were challenged: a Rhode
Island statute providing salary supplements to teachers of non-
secular subjects in private schools and a Pennsylvania statute
reimbursing nonpublic schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials.23
The Rhode Island legislature determined that the quality of
education in the state's nonpublic schools suffered due to the
rising salaries of quality educators. 24 The legislature responded
principles).
15. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
16. Id. at 449.
17. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (establishing that the rationale for the primary effect
inquiry was to avoid "fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or
dependency of one upon the other."); see also Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
243 (1968).
18. Abington, 374 U.S. at 222-23.
19. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
20. Id. at 674-75.
21. See infra text accompanying note 38.
22. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952)).
23. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-11.
24. Id. at 607.
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by enacting The Rhode Island Supplement Act,25 authorizing
state officials to supplement the salaries of teachers who taught
secular subjects in private schools." The supplement was paid
directly to the teachers and could not exceed fifteen percent of
the teacher's annual salary.2" Rhode Island taxpayers brought
suit claiming the act violated the Establishment Clause.2
The Pennsylvania legislature, facing similar concerns over the
quality of private school education, enacted The Pennsylvania
Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act.29 That
act authorized the state Superintendent of Public Instruction to
reimburse private schools for expenditures for teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials. However, reimbursement
was limited to secular subjects that were also taught in public
schools.3" Alton Lemon, a taxpayer and parent of a child at-
tending public school in Pennsylvania, along with other taxpay-
ers, challenged the constitutionality of the statute."'
The Supreme Court held that both statutes were unconstitu-
tional. Although the legislative purpose of both statutes was to
advance the quality of secular education (a valid secular pur-
pose), the teachers in private schools under the direction of
religious authorities would "inevitably experience great difficul-
ties in remaining religiously neutral."2 As a result, the poten-
tial for advancing religion was present.3 Consequently, the
state would continuously monitor the schools receiving aid to
insure that the Establishment Clause was not violated. 4 Yet,
such an excessive degree of state surveillance would result in
excessive entanglement between church and state.3
The Court criticized the "wall" approach established in
Everson and reasoned that "the line of separation, far from
25. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 16-51-1 to -9 (Supp. 1970) (repealed 1980).
26. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 608.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1971).
30. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609-10.
31. Id. at 610-11.
32. Id. at 618.
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being a 'wall,' is [a] blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
ship."36 Consequently, due to "the absence of precisely stated
constitutional prohibitions,"1 7 the Court adopted a three-prong
test, combining three elements from earlier decisions to create a
single multi-part test for Establishment Clause cases.
In Lemon, the Court combined the principles from McGowen,
Abington School District, and Walz to create the following
framework for Establishment Clause analysis: (1) the govern-
mental action must have a secular purpose; (2) the primary
effect cannot advance or inhibit religion; and (3) the action
must not foster excessive entanglement with religion.3" Thus,
the Lemon test grew from criteria used by the Court in prior
cases and was intended to prevent "sponsorship, financial sup-
port, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activi-
ty."3
9
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO Lamb's Chapel
Since 1989 the Supreme Court has decided three important
Establishment Clause cases. These cases are not only important
because of their impact on the relationship between church and
state, but also because they demonstrate that the Establish-
ment Clause analysis is in transition. These recent attempts to
clarify Establishment Clause analysis indicate that the Court
may be ready to replace the Lemon test.
36. Id. at 614; see also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Clauses of the First
Amendment: Where is the Supreme Court Headed?, 32 CATH. LAW. 187, 188-89 (1989)
(discussing separation of church and state and neutrality toward religion).
37. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
38. Id. at 612-13.
39. Id. at 612 (citing walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
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A. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter4"
In County of Allegheny, the Court held, in a five-to-four deci-
sion, that a creche displayed alone in a government building
had the effect of communicating a government endorsement of
religion.4' Yet, a menorah placed next to a Christmas tree did
not have the effect of endorsing religion.42
Although the Court applied the Lemon test, it focused on
Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach.4" Justice Blackmun
wrote for the majority that the city "has chosen to celebrate
Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a patently
Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ.
Under Lynch, and the rest of our cases, nothing more is re-
quired to demonstrate a violation of the Establishment
Clause."" This was the first time that the Court had applied
the endorsement analysis to invalidate a state action. While the
endorsement approach is not inconsistent with the Lemon test,
it certainly is not required by Lemon's three-prong analysis.
Consequently, the County of Allegheny decision has produced
unclear precedent, and demonstrates an inconsistent application
of the Lemon test.45
40. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
41. Id. at 595-600.
42. Id. at 621-25.
43. Id. at 601-02; see also Witters v. Department of Social Serv., 474 U.S. 481, 493
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment) (O'Connor's endorse-
ment inquiry asks whether a "reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts
before us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or be-
lief.").
44. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601-02.
45. Compare Doe v. City of Ottawa, 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
display of sixteen pictures depicting the life of Christ in a city park violated the Es-
tablishment Clause and Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990)
(finding that the display of a nativity scene on the front lawn of a county office
building violated the Establishment Clause with Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 988
F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the display of eight scenes depicting the life of
Christ in a public park did not violate the Establishment Clause) and Mather v.
Village of Munpelein, 864 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the display of a na-
tivity scene with secular holiday symbols on the lawn of the Village Hall did not
violate the Establishment Clause).
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For example, in Lynch v. Donnelly,46 the Court held that a
government sponsored creche was permissible in the "context"
of a traditional Christmas display so long as secular symbols,
such as a Santa Clause house, candy striped poles, a Christmas
tree, and cut out figures of a clown and elephant, were also
included in the display." The Court determined that the dis-
play advanced the legitimate secular purposes of celebration of
a national holiday and the depiction of the origins of the holi-
day.48 In addition, the inclusion of the creche in the Christmas
display did not have the primary effect of advancing religion
since the inclusion of the crbche was "no more of an advance-
ment or endorsement of religion" than other "endorsements"
previously upheld by the Court.49
Although the Court attempted in County of Allegheny to
reject the premise that some advancements or endorsements
may be permitted, it "lost sight of the primary concern of the
endorsement test, which is the effect that governmental dis-
plays of religious symbols may have on minorities and non-
adherents."0 Consequently, the endorsement test was applied
in a subjective manner focusing on the context in which the
creche was displayed.5 This analysis produced an inconsistent
result, as it is difficult to conceive how a city sponsored meno-
rah would not appear to be an endorsement of a particular
religious faith to members of the community.
I County of Allegheny not only signaled the acceptance by the
majority of a modification of the Lemon test, but also demon-
strated that four members of the Court oppose use of the en-
dorsement test. Justice Kennedy wrote:
The notion that cases arising under the Establishment
Clause should be decided by an inquiry into whether a
"reasonable observer" may "fairly understand" government
action to "sen[d] a message to nonadherents that they are
46. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
47. Id at 679-85.
48. Id. at 681.
49. Id. at 682; see, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the
constitutionality of a state-sponsored chaplain).
50. Shahin Rezai, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establish-




outsiders, not full members of the political community," is a
recent, and in my view most unwelcome, addition to our
tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence.52
Justice Kennedy also criticized the majority for applying the
endorsement test and ignoring precedent and historical fact."3
Consequently, County of Allegheny demonstrates that the Jus-
tices strongly disagree on the proper analysis for Establishment
Clause cases.
B. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
MergensM
One area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence that has
traditionally been subject to strict separationist treatment un-
der Lemon is government action affecting public schools.5
However, in Mergens, the Court upheld the Equal Access Act of
19846 and concluded that the Christian club of West Side
High School in Omaha, Nebraska could not be denied access to
school facilities based on the religious content of the meet-
ing57
The conflict arose when a group of students wished to form a
Christian Bible study club that would meet on school property
52. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 668 (Justice Kennedy, with whom C.J. Rehn-
quist, J. White, and J. Scalia, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 674.
54. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
55. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (banning teaching of creationism in
public schools); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (prohibiting
employment of parochial school teachers to teach secular subjects in public schools);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (prohibiting a moment of silence in public
schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public schools is unconstitutional).
56. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1990).
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Feder-
al financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal
access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who
wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of
the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at
such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
57. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235.
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after school.5" Although the school had no written policy
regarding the formation of student clubs, school officials denied
the request. 9 The decision was based on a school policy that
required all student clubs to have a faculty sponsor. 0 The
school officials explained that the proposed club could not have
a faculty sponsor and would violate the Establishment
Clause.6
The Equal Access Act is triggered if any "noncurriculum
related student group"82 can hold meetings on school premises
during noninstructional periods.63 The plurality reasoned that
Lemon would not be violated since the purpose of the act was
secular; the primary effect of the act would not promote religion
since the act expressly prohibited school officials from promot-
ing, leading, or participating in religious meetings; and denial
of access might "create greater entanglement problems in the
form of invasive monitoring to prevent religious speech.""4
This holding extended the Court's reasoning in Widmar v.
Vincent65 that an "equal access" policy would not violate the
Establishment Clause under the Lemon test.66 Consequently,
access to public school facilities by religiously oriented school
groups is not only permissible, but is mandated by statute
when noncurriculum related groups seek access to limited open
forums.
The substantive effect of this decision removes the distinction
that the Court made in Widmar between college and pre-college
students.6" In addition, a school now has an affirmative duty
58. Id. at 231.
59. Id. at 232.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 233.
62. The Court defined a group as "curriculum related" if "the group's subject mat-
ter is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered course; if that
subject matter concerns the body of courses as a whole; or if participation in the
group is required for a particular course or results in academic credit." Id. at 227.
63. Id. at 236.
64. Id. at 253.
65. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
66. Id. at 271-75.
67. In Widmar, the Court indicated that college students "are less impressionable
than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University's policy is
one of neutrality toward religion." Id. at 274 n.14. The same reasoning was applied
to high school students in Mergens. 496 U.S. at 250.
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to provide access to religious groups when school premises are
open to use by other noncurriculum groups. However, the Court
decided the case on statutory grounds and did not rule on whe-
ther the same result would be reached under the First Amend-
ment.68 Finally, the Court reverted to the standard Lemon an-
alysis and did not apply Justice O'Connor's endorsement analy-
sis.69
C. Lee v. Weisman 0
Lee addressed the appropriateness of nonsectarian prayer in
public school graduation ceremonies. A public school student
and her father sought a permanent injunction to prevent inclu-
sion of invocations and benedictions in graduation ceremonies of
city public schools.7 ' They contended that students should not
be compelled by the state to conform to any religious ceremony
even if the message was nonsectarian.72
In Rhode Island, public school principals are allowed to invite
members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions
during graduation ceremonies.73 Principal Lee invited a rabbi
to give the invocation and benediction at Deborah Weisman's
graduation. 4  The principal instructed the rabbi that the
prayer must be nonsectarian and gave him guidelines for
prayers at civic ceremonies. 5 The district court denied a mo-
tion for a temporary restraining order made by Deborah Weis-
man's father to prevent the school from including the prayers
in the graduation ceremony. The Weismans attended the gradu-
ation where the prayers were recited. 6 Subsequently, Mr.
68. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252.
69. But see id. at 264 (Marshall, J., concurring) (expressing concern that allowing
the Christian club access could signify an endorsement of religion); see also id. at 260
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia opposing the use of the
Lemon test and advocating use of the "flexible accommodation" approach).
70. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
71. Id at 2654.
72. Id.
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Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring prayers in
future graduation ceremonies."
Here, the Court held that the pervasive degree of government
involvement clearly violated the Establishment Clause. 8 The
plurality, in yet another five-to-four decision, rejected the
State's and United States', as amicus, argument that since
students were free not to attend the ceremony there was no
coercion by the State to force students to participate in formal
prayer.9
Justice Kennedy expressed his concern over the pervasive
government involvement:
The State's role did not end with the decision to include a
prayer and with the choice of clergyman. Principal Lee
provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of the "Guidelines
for Civic Occasions," and advised him that his prayers
should be nonsectarian. Through these means the principal
directed and controlled the content of the prayer.8"
He pointed out that allowing such involvement by the State
would suggest "that government may establish an official or
civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a
religion with more specific creeds ... ."81 Furthermore, the
high degree of involvement by school officials creates public
pressure on those attending, even though, "subtle and indirect,"
and has an effect of coercing students to participate in religious
exercise."
Consequently, this case was decided without using the Lemon
analysis. Instead, the Court focused on the coercive effect that
the state action would have on the students as evidenced by
Justice Kennedy's conclusion: "No holding by this Court sug-
gests that a school can persuade or compel a student to
participate in a religious exercise. That is being done here, and
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2657.
79. Id. at 2659. The State relied on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), in
which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Nebraska legislature's opening
each session with a prayer by a chaplain paid with public funds.
80. Id. at 2656.
81. Id. at 2657.
82. Id. at 2658.
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it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment."83
Although Lemon was ignored, the Lemon analysis was not
affirmatively rejected by the majority. "This case does not re-
quire us to revisit the difficult questions dividing us in recent
cases, questions of the definition and full scope of the principles
governing the extent of permitted accommodation by the State
for the religious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens."s'
Yet in a concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun with whom
Justices Stevens and O'Connor join, Justice Blackmun rejects,
as a new test, the coercion approach taken by Justice Kennedy.
Justice Blackmun asserts that "[allthough our precedents make
clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to
prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient."85
These Justices analyzed the case using the Lemon framework,
and reasoned that coercion indicates government is endorsing
religion. 6
Finally, the four dissenters argued that the Court should not
ignore historical practices. Justice Scalia wrote that "[glovern-
ment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support
for religion ... are an accepted part of our political and cultur-
al heritage."" The dissenters rejected both the "psycho-coer-
cion test" and the Lemon test as legitimate approaches to Es-
tablishment Clause analysis.8 8
Consequently, there is strong agreement among the Justices
that Lemon is no longer a workable framework for Establish-
ment Clause cases. However, there is also significant disagree-
ment on which test should replace Lemon. This apparent dis-
agreement led to the surprise return of the Lemon test in
Lamb's Chapel.
83. Id. at 2661.
84. Id. at 2655.
85. Id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
86. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2678 (Scalia, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J.,
join, dissenting) (citing Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
88. Id. at 2685.
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III. LEMON RETURNS: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District89
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dis-
trict, the Supreme Court held that the Center Moriches Union
Free School District violated the free speech clause of the First
Amendment by denying Lamb's Chapel access to public school
premises to show a film depicting child rearing from a religious
viewpoint. 0 Furthermore, the Court concluded that church ac-
cess to the school premises was not a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment.91  The Court once
again applied the controversial Lemon test to analyze the Es-
tablishment Clause issue.
Lamb's Chapel sought permission to use public school facili-
ties to show a six part film series on child rearing and family
values.92 The school board twice denied the request since the
film "appear[ed] to be church related."93 The board's decision
was based on a brochure that described the content of the
films. The church challenged the denial as a violation of the
Freedom of Speech Clause, the Assembly Clause, the Free Exer-
cise Clause, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.94
The school board justified its decision to deny access to
Lamb's Chapel based on section 414 of the New York Education
Law.95 That section authorizes local districts to promulgate
rules and regulations for use of school property when the school
property is not being used for school purposes. Local rule 10
allows social, civic, and recreational uses.96 Rule 7 provides
that "school premises shall not be used by any group for reli-
gious purposes."97
89. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
90. Id. at 2145-47.
91. Id. at 2148-49.
92. Id. at 2144.
93. Id. at 2145.
94. Id.
95. Title I. Article 9 NY CLS Educ. § 414 (1993).
96. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144.
97. Id.; see also Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)




The district court granted summary judgment for the School
District. 8 The court determined that the facilities were a lim-
ited public forum.99 Since the forum was not open to religious
worship or instruction, denial of access to school facilities was
viewpoint neutral and therefore did not violate the Free Speech
Clause."' The district court also found that denying church
access to the facilities did not demonstrate hostility toward
religion and advancement of nonreligion.'0 ' Thus, the denial
was not a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment."°2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's decision holding that the forum was
not a traditional public forum or a designated public forum.
The appellate court agreed that the forum was a limited public
forum, and as such any exclusions need only be reasonable and
viewpoint neutral.' 3
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court looked at other uses of the
forum and concluded that a lecture or film on child rearing and
family values would be a use for social or civic purposes permit-
ted by rule 10.104 In addition, there was no "indication in the
record before [the Court] that the application to exhibit the
particular film involved here was or would have been denied for
a school may be used under section 414.').
98. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), afftd, 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
99. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 97.
100. Id. at 99.
101. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 736 F. Supp. 1247,
1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
102. Id.
103. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 389
(2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
104. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147
(1993).
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any reason other than the fact that the presentation would
have been from a religious perspective."" 5
Since the topic here dealt with a subject that was permissi-
ble, the church could not be denied access to the forum. "[Tihe
First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in
ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of
others."' Having decided that the church was entitled to use
the property, the Court addressed the issue of whether such
use would be a violation of the Establishment Clause.
The Court concluded that allowing the group access to school
property would not violate the Establishment Clause. First, the
Court acknowledged that the State's interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation may justify an abridgment of
protected free speech." 7 However, applying the Lemon test to
these facts, there was no violation of the Establishment
Clause.'0 8 The majority did not employ lengthy analysis to
dispose of the Establishment Clause issue, but rather relied
heavily on Widmar v. Vincent"0 9 to conclude that there was no
danger of the community perceiving that the school district was
endorsing religion."0  In addition, any benefit to religion
would only be. incidental."'
C. Analysis
The position taken by the Court in Lamb's Chapel is signifi-
cant for three main reasons. First, the decision expanded the
equal access principles established in Widmar and further
broadened in Mergens. Second, the holding is somewhat limited
because the Court determined that Rule 7 was unconstitutional-
ly applied, but refused to address the issue of whether the rule
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2147-48 (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)).
107. Id. at 2148 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)).
108. Id.
109. 454 U.S. 263; see also supra text accompanying notes 65, 67.




is facially invalid. Third, the Lemon test was resuscitated de-
spite the Court's refusal to apply it in Lee v. Weisman."2
The principle from Widmar that a university is prohibited
from discriminating against a registered student religious group
by denying the group access to a generally open forum was
expanded in Mergens to encompass limited forums in high
schools. Lamb's Chapel broadens access to school facilities by
allowing religious organizations, not comprised of school stu-
dents, to use public school facilities which are open to other
non-student groups. Since these outside organizations do not
fall within the protection expressly afforded to students by the
Equal Access Act, Lamb's Chapel provides constitutional protec-
tion, under the Free Speech Clause, for religious viewpoints so
long as the non-public forum has been opened to the speaker's
topic and the speaker is a member of a class that is entitled to
use the particular forum."'
However, such access may be limited in the future since the
Court did not rule on whether religious speech or conduct could
be prohibited. Rule 7, prohibiting use of school property for
religious purposes, was unconstitutional as applied in Lamb's
Chapel. The Court acknowledged that the school could control
access to the nonpublic forum "based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reason-
able in light of the purpose served by the forum and are view-
point-neutral.""4 Nevertheless, the Court questioned the Sec-
ond Circuit's support for holding that Rule 7 was rea-
sonable.' Thus a total ban on religious use of school proper-
ty could be attacked in the future under this theory.
Finally, the Lemon test was applied to settle the Establish-
ment Clause issue and a majority of the Justices joined in the
opinion. Not only did the Court apply the test, which is surpris-
ing since it ignored Lemon in Weisman, but six Justices sup-
ported use of the Lemon analysis. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist
112. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see supra part llI.C.
113. 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
114. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983)).
115. Id. at 2147 n.6.
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and Justice White, who have opposed the Lemon test in the
past, and most recently in the dissent in Weisman, joined the
majority in Lamb's Chapel supporting use of the Lemon test.
Although Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in
judgment, all three opposed the application of the Lemon test.
Justice Kennedy felt that use of the Lemon test was "unsettling
and unnecessary.""' In addition, Justice Scalia voiced strong
disapproval of the Lemon test.
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some
ghoul in a late night horror movie that repeatedly sits up
in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and
school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School
District."7
Despite clear opposition in the past to the continued use of the
Lemon test by the Court, the Justices were once again, unwill-
ing to replace Lemon."' In addition, use of the Lemon test
was given stronger support than in recent decisions which indi-
cated Lemon would be replaced.
IV. CONCLUSION
The future of the Lemon test remains as cloudy as it has
been for the last decade. Further, a quick review of the current
Justices' position does little to resolve the problems created by
Lemon. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, with whom
Justice Thomas is now aligned, are clearly in favor of an ac-
comodationist approach." 9 Justice Kennedy has taken a neu-
tral approach but recognizes that "proper sensitivity to our
traditions" 20 must be considered. He has favored the coercion
116. Id. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
117. Id. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. Justice Scalia noted that "no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices
have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's
heart . . . and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so." Id. at 2150.
119. See generally Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test,
72 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (West 1992) (discussing various positions taken by Justices).
120. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989).
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analysis to distinguish between actions that coerce religious
beliefs and actions that accommodate the right to exercise one's
faith.'21 Justice O'Connor favors the endorsement approach
which would revise the Lemon test. Finally, Justice Stevens
and Justice Souter advocate a strict separationist approach, but
have not shown strong disapproval of Lemon. 2
Justice Ginsburg's appointment may not significantly change
this outlook. When pressed in confirmation hearings on her
thoughts about the Establishment Clause, she acknowledged
that Lemon was the test.2 Although she seemed receptive to
other avenues of analysis, she offered no replacement for the
test.
124
As a result, Establishment Clause analysis will likely remain
a mystery. Until the Justices can agree on the fundamental
principles on which the Establishment Clause was founded and
on a workable replacement for the Court's current mode of
analysis, Lemon is not likely to be replaced. "Such a docile and
useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somno-
lent state; one never knows when one might need him."25
Wirt P. Marks, IV
121. Franklin, supra note 119, at 2.
122. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2668 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (ac-
cepting Lemon and advocating a strict separationist standard); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
123. Marcia Coyle & Marianne Levelle, Judge Ginsburg Gives Little Away at
Hearings, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 5.
124. Id.
125. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2150
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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